S C E N A R I O B

Screening People, Vehicles, and Goods

BACKGROUND

As discussed in Chapter 7, screening people and things coming into a major-event venue is an important component of a balanced, layered approach to security. The effective-ness of screening measures in preventing, deterring, or discovering CBRN threats will depend both on policy and technology. One of the most effective CBRN security mea-sures is to enact and enforce a liquid ban, similar to those in effect on commercial-airline flights. Such bans can be controversial and may be difficult to put into practice.

Tradeoffs need to be made in security screening. Speed and efficiency need to be balanced by thoroughness, and a different balance is struck at every major event. One purpose behind this scenario is to provoke a useful discussion of where that balance should be set.

It is important to remember that searching venues and screening entering goods and personnel are countermeasures against an internal release inside the event perimeter. These measures do not deter or prevent external releases. By no means am I suggesting that there is no value in conducting searches and screenings. Because an internal release generally requires less material than an external release, deterring internal releases makes the terrorists' job harder.

THE SCENARIO

You are responsible for CBRN and HAZMAT planning and response for a high-visibility sporting event that is being held at a stadium in your city. A crowd of 72,000 people is expected to attend, as well as several thousand staff of every description. Security officials have received general intelligence that some extremist groups wish to target the event, but no specific information has become available.

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CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response by Dan Kaszeta

Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

3 1 8 PRACTICAL SCENARIOS

FIGURE B.1 Walkthrough portals can be used to screen people for the existence of radioactive isotopes. Source: photo courtesy of Thermo Fisher Scientific.

Planning for the event has taken several months, and a reasonably good conven-tional security plan has been developed for the stadium. Large numbers of contract secu-rity personnel will be used to operate x-ray machines and metal detectors. A "no bottled liquids" rule has been in effect for several years at the venue, but in practice small bottles and jars, such as medicines, personal-hygiene items, and baby food, are routinely let in, as the rule is largely focused on restricting alcoholic drinks. Vehicle and cargo screening has never taken place at the venue.

Episode 1

It is 90 days before the event. The security management for the event asks you for advice on detecting radiation hazards and preventing radioactive materials from entering the event. What advice do you give? Can such screening be incorporated into a conventional screening plan? How would you do it?

Episode 2

It is 45 days before the event. After much discussion of explosive threats, it has been decided to conduct screening of vehicles. Half of the vast parking lots at the stadium will not be used for conventional parking, as these areas are considered to be too close to the event. Significant offsite parking and shuttle buses will be used. A vehicle checkpoint will screen vehicles entering through the outer perimeter. In practice, the vehicles admit-ted would include VIP parking, buses for the sports teams, commercial vehicles (such as

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food and drink deliveries), media vehicles (such as T V trucks), and other such vehicles that require close access to the site. Trained E O D technicians will be on hand for vehicle searches, as will explosive-detection dog teams.

You are requested to advise on how to adapt the security screening procedures to include CBRN threats. What will you tell your superiors? Can you think of useful things to tell security screeners about what to look for?

Episode 3

It is 30 days before the event. Your superiors have finally been convinced that CBRN is a serious threat. You have been asked to provide advice and training to the security screeners. What measures can be undertaken at the screening checkpoints to reduce the threat of CBRN materials being brought into the venue?

Episode 4

The event is happening in a few hours. People and vehicles are being screened. You are confronted with several events. How do you respond to the following situations?

• A member of the public has an unknown substance in a jar at a security checkpoint

• An unidentified liquid is leaking from a package in the back of a courier truck at the vehicle checkpoint

• A person passing through a checkpoint sets off a radiation alarm

• An explosive-detection dog and its handler are experiencing respiratory distress after screening a delivery van

• A security screener is inspecting a bag and falls over, displaying signs of nerve-agent poisoning

• An item that may be an improvised chemical device is discovered in a backpack by x-ray screening at a checkpoint

DISCUSSION AND TIPS FOR SUCCESS

Have a Reasonable View about what is Possible

No screening process or technology is perfect. It is always possible that some kind of CBRN material will slip through. Existing personal screening techniques are of only limited effectiveness in finding significant quantities of chemical or biological hazards. This is why we consider personnel screening to be only one part of a multilayered approach to CBRN protection and response.

Staff Needs to be Screened

A common fault at events is to permit event staff, press, or VIP visitors to circumvent security screening. It is relatively easy to exploit the chaos of a major event to imperson-ate a legitimate employee or to "gate-crash" with an official delegation. I have done it myself, and it is often not very hard. Therefore, screening efforts need to cover the staff

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as well as the public. Screening procedures should be explained to venue staff as early as possible in the planning phases so that any friction or conflict is reduced.

"Find or Function"

Security-screening staff, whether they realize it or not, are conducting a "find or func-tion" search. If a terrorist device is present, it may be caused to function by security-screening measures. Indeed, a device could be deliberately designed to detonate if screened. Therefore, response plans need to reflect this fact, and emergency plans should consider that security-screening areas are likely spots for CBRN incidents.

Use of Perimeters

One technique is to use two perimeters. An outer perimeter is designed to keep out vehi-cles (and vehicle-sized threats), and an inner perimeter is designed to keep out persons. Therefore, vehicles and goods should be screened at the outer perimeter and persons at the inner perimeter.

Use Screening Technology to Your Advantage

Security-screening technology no longer consists merely of metal detectors and x-ray machines. A wide variety of detection technology can be used for security screening. There are now various types of equipment that are useful for screening for CBRN mate-rials at checkpoints. See Chapter 14 for more information.

WHAT NOT TO DO

Let the Queue Run out the Door

Anyone who has been to an airport in the last 20 years can understand that anything that slows down the screening process results in lengthy queues. Stricter scrutiny, equipment malfunction, and lack of screening resources (personnel or equipment) will serve to slow down the screening process. Up to a certain point, this is a manageable phenomenon.

But lengthy delays can cause many problems. Not every queue will be orderly. Public-order problems can arise. In addition, a large accumulation of members of the public outside a major-event venue can be just as much a symbolic target for terrorists. If it takes an hour to get through the security queues, then the area outside the checkpoint becomes an easier and more lucrative target than the interior of the venue. Security pro-viders need to remember that they are protecting people, not just a building.

Lose Control of a Checkpoint

If you let the crowd overrun one checkpoint or let someone through without screening, the integrity of the entire venue is compromised. In such an instance, you must treat the venue as if it had not been searched.

Allow Liquids into the Venue

A no-liquid policy whereby jars, cans, and bottles are prohibited is one of the better countermeasures against CBRN materials being brought into a venue. Some exceptions

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may be made for small quantities, such as baby food or medical items, but as a general policy it is best to keep liquids out.

Accept Things at Face Value

It may say water on the bottle and it may look like water, but is it water? Have a proce-dure to verify the contents in such situations.

Let People Bypass Screening

People are more compliant with screening if they see that it clearly applies to everybody. Venue staff needs to be screened like everyone else. Large events have large numbers of support employees. Many of them will be temporary staff relatively unknown to the per-manent staff. Not everyone with a camera vest and a dozen lenses is actually a member of the media.

Don't Explain the Security Screening Process to the Venue Staff

You will get a lot less resistance from the venue management and staff if you are proac-tive and explain the process ahead of time. A little bit of "allow an extra 20 minutes to get to work tomorrow—pretend you're at the airport" goes a long way in my experience.

Let People Tag Along with VI Ps

Of course, you are not going to get the Prime Minister of Belgium to step through the metal detector and empty his pockets. But is absolutely everyone in his entourage really supposed to be there? Are they all credentialed? Was something planted in some-one's briefcase? By all means, let the prime minister and his credentialed security detail through, but the best policy is to screen the others. I have personally blagged my way into the seat of government in three countries in Europe by attaching myself to an official-looking delegation. I was caught once but got through the other two times.